Development and Difference by Abbott, Andrew
 
European Journal of Pragmatism and
American Philosophy 
VIII-2 | 2016
Pragmatism and the Writing of History
Development and Difference










Andrew Abbott, « Development and Difference », European Journal of Pragmatism and American
Philosophy [Online], VIII-2 | 2016, Online since 16 January 2017, connection on 30 April 2019. URL :
http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/639  ; DOI : 10.4000/ejpap.639 
This text was automatically generated on 30 April 2019.
Author retains copyright and grants the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy right
of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Development and Difference
Pragmatism and the Social Process
Andrew Abbott
1 A central premise of the Chicago School of Sociology has been its insistence that social
facts are located in place and time. The meaning of a social fact is always relative to its
context of other social facts. Methodologically, this rule has implied a certain hesitancy
about the decontextualized approach characteristic of survey analysis. Substantively, it
has taken shape in a focus on “natural history” and “natural areas,” that is, on typical
developments over time and typical differences between parts of the social world (Abbott
1997). 
2 Development in time and difference in space are closely related. The idea of personal
development seems natural and unproblematic as a result of our everyday familiarity
with narratives of experience. But narrative cannot be a complete account of social life,
because the past does not reach out and influence the present, as it does so often in our
stories. The influence of the deep past on the present must come through the traces that
that deep past has left in succeeding presents. Causality happens in the present moment:
as George Herbert Mead says, the world is a world of events. This means that present
differences – both within the self and beyond it – are the present traces of past events. In
some sense, difference in the present is then the correlative, the trace, the record, of past
events, and therefore development and difference are at the deepest level two sides of the
same phenomenon – of process itself. 
3 In practice, however, these problems are usually investigated separately, and indeed we
might expect them to have separate sources. For the Chicago School in particular, a likely
influence  would  be  the  pragmatists.  The  Chicago  School  took  shape  in  the  years
pragmatism was strongest at Chicago, and indeed there were extremely close relations
between W. I. Thomas – the central progenitor of the Chicago School – and his pragmatist
philosopher colleagues John Dewey and George Herbert Mead. Moreover, while the topics
of development and difference are are largely absent from the earlier pragmatists Peirce
and James, they are important for Mead and central for Dewey.
4 In this paper I shall examine how the pragmatists regarded the context of a single self in
time (the problem of personal development over the life course) and the context of a
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single self in social space (the problem not only of surrounding individuals but also of
surrounding and fundamentally different groups). After a quick glance at the ontologies
of the earlier pragmatists, I discuss the problems of individual development and social
difference as they emerged society-wide during and after the first pragmatist generation.
Having  specified  these  problems,  I  can  set  the  second  pragmatist  generation  in  the
context they provide. The paper concludes with a discussion of the centrality of accounts
of development and difference in a processualized social ontology.
5 The usual disclaimers apply. I do not provide a definitive account. This is a reading and
reflection  on  a  possible  linkage,  not  a  precise  exercise  in  intellectual  history.  The
principal focus is on the pragmatist authors, not on the Chicago School, whose interest in
these topics I  have discussed extensively elsewhere.  But as a theorist  in the Chicago
tradition,  I  am principally interested in development and difference because of their
twofold centrality to the processual account of the social world. By reading (especially)
Mead and Dewey in this  light,  I  hope to  find new issues  and problems that  require
theoretical clarification. As for the evolution of pragmatist thought in itself,  that is a
topic that others are better equipped to undertake. 
 
I. The Earlier Pragmatists and the Great Watershed
6 Peirce’s account of ontology, as of nearly everything else, embeds ontology within the
master analysis of signs. The result is an epistemological ontology, if we can imagine such
a thing; observable phenomena are defined in terms of their logical structure. Pierce’s
purely logical  approach disregards the passage of  historical  (that is,  particular)  time,
whether in the lives of individual humans, or in the evolution of “larger histories,” or,
ultimately, in the evolution of the species. Peirce’s pragmatism evades the problem of
particular temporality almost completely.
7 Similarly, the Jamesean individual – at least in the two versions of the psychology course
– does not really change over life course time. James’s famous line about the baby’s world
as  a  “blooming,  buzzing  confusion”  (James  1950,  1:  488)  comes  in  the  middle  of  a
discussion of  perceptual  discrimination,  not  at  the beginning of  a  phenomenological
analysis  of  individual  development.  Nor did James study whether the “universals” of
human psychology change in historical time or across social space, since such changes
would imply differences between people rather than properties universal to all of them.
This implication would in turn violate one of James’s basic premises in his project of
inventing psychology – the premise that there was such an abstraction as “an individual,”
whose universal properties were the proper study of psychology. 
8 In  short,  the  early  pragmatists  did  not  really  address  the  basic  problems  of  social
ontology nor did they worry much about temporality or differences. To the extent that
they did consider social ontology, they took either a logicist or an “abstract individualist”
position,  positions  long  familiar  from  the  contractarians  and  central  to  vernacular
American social theory at the time. In consequence, they have little to tell us about the
need to combine concerns for ontology and temporality into a single framework.1
9 Between the early and later pragmatists the problems of development and difference
became central in American social thought. But they did so in quite different ways, and,
more important, their theorists chose very different presuppositions. My earlier remarks
presented the problems of development and difference as two aspects of a single issue:
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the  need  for  a  viable  processual  ontology  for  the  social  world.  But  the  differing
intellectual trajectories of studies of development and difference have made this unity of
approach more and more difficult as time passed. 
 
A. Individual Development
10 Around the turn of the twentieth century, there emerged from a variety of sources a
concern with what we would now call developmental psychology – the evolution of the
self across the life course. This concern flowered in writers like James Mark Baldwin,
Adolf  Meyer,  and Sigmund Freud.  The intellectual  sources of  the new developmental
psychology lay in part in changes internal to the new discipline of psychology itself. The
field was pondering the old philosophical debate of associationism versus apriorism, but
with novel data from anatomical and physiological studies of the human nervous system.
At  the  same  time,  some  sources  of  the  new developmental  concern  lay  outside  the
discipline,  for example in the newly psychological novel,  where writers like Flaubert,
Eliot,  Tolstoy,  Conrad,  and  William  James’s  brother  Henry  followed  the  lead  of
Dostoyevsky (and other  writers  of  Bildungsromane)  away from the realist,  social-level
analysis  characteristic  of  Dickens,  Balzac,  and  Zola,  and  towards  an  intensively
developmental account of individual transformation.2
11 Alongside those intellectual sources, two great new social institutions also demanded a
practical  focus  on  developmental  psychology.  One  was  mass  schooling,  where
developmental questions became particularly salient because of the cultural differences
that  immigration  had  induced  in  the  school-age  population  of  the  United  States,
differences often misunderstood as developmental differences rather than cultural ones.
(The Army Alpha Test debate in 1917-18 was a late example of this misperception. See
Carson 1993.) The other source was the mental hospital system, in which hundreds of
thousands of Americans lived, and where hereditarian pessimism was giving way to a
more optimistic life-course approach in the work of people like Meyer and Freud. This
new  work  facilitated  the  transfer  of  methods  for  “abnormal  psychology”  to  the
perplexing  plethora  of  “nervous”  diseases  then  newly  common  among  the  general
bourgeois  population.  The Freudian approach would triumph in that  expanded,  non-
psychotic clientele, of course, but it was in fact only one of many such analyses of the
emotional development of the self.3
12 Thus,  the  problems  of  education  and  anxiety  guaranteed  that  the  later  pragmatists
confronted a world obsessed not only intellectually but also practically with individual
development and change over the life course. The main academic result of this obsession
– the theoretical and experimental literature on developmental psychology – was already
extensive  by  1900.  For  example,  James  Mark  Baldwin  and  others  were  already
experimenting with children (usually their own) to uncover the exact course of mental
development.  A good deal  was “known” about  the order in which various skills  and
abilities developed in childhood, and the beginnings had been laid of a “natural history”
of the human individual across the life course.4
13 In Baldwin, this theory of individual development was coupled directly with a concept of
larger historical flow. Baldwin’s profound commitment to evolutionary theory as then
understood led him to base his theory of development on Haeckel’s notion that ontogeny
recapitulates  phylogeny.  This  recapitulation  concept  recognized  two  levels  of
development  –  those  of  the  individual  organism  and  of  the  species.  The  two  were
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differentiated mainly by their time scales.  The one unfolded in decades,  the other in
millions of years.
14 But between these two was nothing. The Haeckel phrase – and the Baldwinian psychology
– did not envision processes on some intermediate time scale. Specifically, Baldwin had
no concept of the “history of social entities” – the thing we would today call “history.”
Yet outside psychology, such a “historical” level of process was well recognized at the
time. Debates about the nature of history were endemic in the later nineteenth century;
we have only to recall Ranke’s positivism, Schmoller’s economics, Buckle’s evolutionism,
and the French historical school of Langlois and Seignobos. And this new historicism had
a quite specific view of the temporality of history. “History” was typically seen as “larger”
than the  individual,  a  conceptualization  that  would eventually  pass  uncritically  into
modern social theorizing as the idea of “levels” of social reality. This “larger” history, in
the view of the highly progressivist late nineteenth century historical writers, occurred
on a time scale roughly one order of magnitude longer than individual development. It
was  a  matter  of  hundreds  of  years,  but  not  of  millions.  Yet  such  history  went
unrecognized  in  the  Baldwinian  psychology,  which  theorized  only  individual
development and species evolution.5
15 Like Baldwin, Freud also developed a complex developmental theory for individuals, in
his case a theory of emotional development. Unlike Baldwin (but like Rousseau, in the
different case of social inequality), he did this on purely hypothetical principles. That is,
rather than extensively observing early childhood behavior, Freud reasoned back from
later symptomatology to earlier events, a procedure that obviously involved very strong
assumptions about the causal effects of early experience. This procedure seemed in many
ways cognate with that of “history” as an emerging discipline, which – as I just noted –
usually read the past through the lenses of progress and thereby made the past simply
the starting place for the present, rather than a period of interest on its own, from which
other  possible  presents  might  have  descended.  Because  of  this  correlation  of
methodologies, we might expect Freud to have come closer than Baldwin to a merged
conception of individual development and historical change.6
16 But while Freud’s theory of the larger process was not on the heroic evolutionary time
scale, it ignored history even in the progressivist sense, much less in the contingent one.
In a late series of works stimulated by the great puzzle of the First World War, Freud
urged the purely hypothetical history of the “primal horde.” As Freud knew perfectly
well,  the concept of  the primal horde was not really historical,  but simply projected
Freud’s  theories  of  individual  development  onto  an  indefinite  social  past.  And  in
discussing  civilizational  sublimation,  Freud  returned  (still  hypothetically)  to  this
indefinite past:
When  a  child  reacts  to  his  first  great  instinctual  frustrations  with  excessively
strong aggressiveness and with a correspondingly severe super-ego, he is following
a phylogenetic model and is going beyond the response that would be currently
justified;  for  the  father  of  prehistoric  times  was  undoubtedly  terrible,  and  an
extreme amount of aggressiveness may be attributed to him. (Freud 1961 :78)
17 Like the “state of nature” of the various contractarians, the primal horde concept was an
arbitrary fiction, not in any way independent of Freud’s developmental theory. Moreover,
if the primal horde was not really historical, neither was it in any way particular. Freud
himself never seems to have doubted the universality of any of his major conceptions,
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although, to be sure, anthropologists influenced by Freud would soon begin to ask about
the possible cultural universality (or limitation) of his theories.7
18 Thus  the  great  developmentalists  Baldwin and Freud both  more  or  less  avoided the
question of contingent and particular “history” in order to pursue a universal concept of
individual  development.  This  allowed them to produce very elaborate developmental
theories,  but  at  the  cost  of  assuming  a  universal,  historically  decontextualized
psychology. This new developmental theory provided a crucial context and challenge to
evolving pragmatist thinking, by demonstrating how much could be achieved by ignoring
the social question in either of its guises: as the question of historical change or as the
question of the social differences that arose out of that historical change.8
19 The developmentalists’ achievements could not be ignored. The pragmatists read Baldwin
attentively, finding much to dispute but also much to absorb, as can be seen from Dewey’s
review (1898) of Baldwin’s magnum opus. And like all intellectuals alive in those years,
the pragmatists also read Freud, whose work seemed to destroy any possibility of a non-
developmental account of emotional life. This encounter with developmental psychology
must  have  strongly  prejudiced the  later  pragmatists  against  the  purely  abstract
temporalities of the earlier pragmatists, but at the same time they cannot have missed




20 The other great social  issue providing a context for later pragmatist thinking was of
course the question of social differences, posed in the United States first by the slavery
issue and the Civil War, and second by the immense immigration following 1880. Like
developmental  theories,  these  discussions  of  social  difference were often in  dialogue
(sometimes  positive,  sometimes  negative)  with  the  hereditarian  approaches  to  social
differences  dominant  in  the  1880s,  which  were  themselves  traceable  to  Darwin  and
Spencer.9
21 The social differences literature had two major strands. Both were normative literatures,
driven by the concern to ameliorate what were perceived as fundamental problems in
American society. They are best differentiable by their strategies for that amelioration.
One strand would resolve social  differences  by designing an educational  system that
would in principle gradually destroy those differences, leaving behind people who were –
as it were – diverse but not different. They would be liberal citizens, completely equal
makers of a social contract. But within that contract they would – it was hoped – make a
wonderful and richly rewarding diversity.10
22 This first strand of “social differences” thinking did admit of a simple history of social
differences:  different  peoples  come  together,  encounter  one  another,  and  ultimately
merge into some new whole without losing their individual uniqueness. In the Deweyan
and Americanization versions, this amalgamation would happen through education. In
the  Robert  Park  “race  relations  cycle”  version,  it  would  happen  through  mutual
confrontation in which different groups would “educate” each other, which would be
followed by assimilation. Either way, the history imagined was usually progressivist and
straightforward. It  was not massively contingent or complex,  nor did it  involve truly
irreconcilable difference and conflict, or their sequel of social catastrophe.11
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23 The other  strand of  writing on social  differences  focused on dichotomous models  of
differences, which it thought were not so easily resolved. This view is of course most
clearly associated with Marx and the scientific socialists, but it was quite general in the
late nineteenth century. Its clearest version was the capital/labor framework, pervasive
in American public life – as in European public life – throughout the period. In the United
States, most of the other dramatic social differences of the time mapped onto this one
quite clearly,  so all  the versions of  difference were more or less  equivalent:  religion
(Protestant capital versus Jewish and Catholic labor), ethnicity (Anglo-Saxon and German
capital versus East and South European labor), language (English-speaking capital versus
foreign-speaking  labor),  migrant  status  (native  or  old-migrant  capital  versus  new
immigrant labor) and so on. The dichotomous difference approach presumed a simple,
non-overlapping system of social differences. In its dominant progressive version, the
approach assumed that modified social institutions – in particular, the redistribution of
wealth – would unmake the dichotomous differences. For adherents of this approach,
neither  social  mobility  (under which the interclass line would blur  as  people moved
across it in both directions) nor class conflict (under which explicit confrontation would
lead to revolution) would really resolve social differences. There must rather be steady,
institutionalized amelioration.12
24 Thus,  both strands of  thought about social  differences in the period were unlike the
developmental theories in that they were somewhat historical. They focused on actual
processes of change and usually escaped the excesses of Spencerian evolutionism. But
other  than  the  Parkian  race-relations  and  ethnicity  writings,  they  were  not  really
contingent  or  pluridirectional.  They  were  often  simplistic  in  terms  of  the  social
differences involved, since the vast majority of differences were mapped onto a fairly
simple dichotomy of native/immigrant or capital/labor. They differed chiefly in the kinds
of institutional change expected to reconcile difference: long-run demographic processes
like  education  and  assimilation  in  the  first  case  and  shorter-run  and  more  directly
ameliorative transfer policies in the second case.
25 That the social differences problem preoccupied the later pragmatists is evident. Dewey’s
entire oeuvre on education was concerned with social difference and with the challenges
that a newly complex urban society presented to traditional educational practices. In a
more  muted way,  Mead’s  writings  also  concerned the  problem of  difference,  and as
Treasurer of Hull House he was extremely active in progressive affairs.13
26 In summary, the later pragmatists wrote in a context very much shaped by the two great
social questions of individual development and social differences and by the literatures
responding to those questions.  But the two great questions pointed in very different
intellectual directions. For they took very different approaches to theorizing social life in
liberal,  individualist  society.  One approach to this cat’s  cradle of  causality pulled the
strings of determination so as to make evident the trajectories of individuals, in order to
understand how to create trajectories that would produce proper citizens for a liberal
republic. This was the theory of development and the educational route to reconciliation
of social differences.
27 To be sure, the Parkian assimilation literature had a more potentially contingent and
heterogeneous account than the schooling literature, but ultimately it too was captured
by a unidirectional progress story, partly through its submergence under the black-white
race  issue  after  the  ending  of  immigration  in  1925.  Overall,  the  focus  on  human
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development  pushed  its  theorists  in  the  direction  of  simple,  directed,  uncontingent
history.
28 By contrast, the other approach pulled the cat’s cradle quite differently, because it aimed
to reconcile group differences in the short-term present.  The dichotomous theory of
social  differences  focused  on  the  immediate  sources  of  conflict.  Although  all  these
differences and conflicts had quite particular and contingent histories, those histories
tended  to  disappear,  for  the  focus  was  on conflict  between  present  groups  whose
existence and conflicting interests were taken as self-evident and (tacitly, and perhaps
for simplicity’s  sake) as more or less  eternal.  The welter of  those conflicts  was then
conceptually tamed and simplified by the dichotomous characterization of society. The
great problem with this literature would of course prove to be that when one pulled the
cat’s  cradle  of  determination  by  the  threads  of  group  conflict,  one  confronted
immediately the problem that individuals were members of not one but dozens of groups,
conflicting on different dimensions and in different areas. As long as conflict was unified
and dichotomous, the theory was safe. But the superproductivity of capitalism after 1920
permitted a concomitant expansion of consumer society, and this new abundance quickly
subdivided  and  crosscut  the  seemingly  eternal  dichotomous  conflicts  of  the  late
nineteenth century.
29 In summary, the internal logics of their two problematics rapidly drove these literatures
apart. What were useful simplifying assumptions in one literature were foolish premises
for the other, and vice versa. In particular, with respect to temporality, one literature
found the other short-sighted because it ignored the importance of development, while
the other literature found the one dilatory because it hesitated to demand immediate
redress.  All  this  arose,  in  fact,  because  these  two  great  questions  of  individual
development  and  social  differences  were  not  theorized  together.  The  rewards  for
narrowing  one’s  assumptions  were  too  great,  and  so  their  separation  continuously
increased.
30 This social and intellectual background is necessary to specify the context in which the
later pragmatists wrote. It is obvious that neither the approach of Peirce nor that of
James  was  helpful  in  the  new  context.  It  made  little  sense  to  talk  about  universal
properties of either symbols or psychologies. More particularly, in the new context it
made little sense to ignore the development of the various aspects of human psychology
across the life course, nor to ignore social differences at a given time. These facts had
been clearly recognized by the decade 1900-1910. The later pragmatists thus faced a much
more complex intellectual landscape, with two fundamentally different ways to pull the
cat’s  cradle of  social  causality.  They had to rethink completely the analyses  of  their
elders. 
 
II. The Later Pragmatists
31 The later pragmatists – Mead and Dewey chief among them - dealt with this new pair of
problems in quite divergent ways. Surprisingly, Dewey – the elder of the two – was the
more  radical.  But  this  fact  probably  reflects  disciplinary  allegiances.  Mead  was  a
professional philosopher, while Dewey was not only a professional philosopher, but also a
school reformer, a political theorist, and a public intellectual. 
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A. Mead on Development and Difference
32 Mead’s social psychology diverges immediately from the union Haeckel (and Baldwin)
had proposed. Ontogeny and phylogeny were pulled apart. Mead’s account of the origins
of symbols and cognition was phylogenetic in general outline; humans developed a larger
repertory of significant symbols than other animals. And his analysis of mind remains
within this phylogenetic world of  pigeons and parrots and dogfights – animals to be
contrasted with “what  we call  a  reflective  individual”  (Mead 1934:  73).  Yet  much of
Mead’s argument is phylogenetic only in a limited sense. He compares the different static
states  of  humans and other animals  rather than developing a  seriously  phylogenetic
argument of how one kind of system leads to another within a new species, given the
evolutionary mechanisms then known.14
33 Thus, Mead’s phylogeny was not very phylogenetic. Neither, in fact, was his ontogeny
very ontogenetic.  As is well  known, Mead’s account rests on the idea that significant
symbols  called out  the same reaction in  the self  as  in  the other.  This  was  simply a
philosophically precise elaboration of the Jamesean/Cooleyan looking-glass self concept.
But in terms of my earlier argument, it was a form of “abstract individualism,” with the
slight  twist  that  it  was  not  so  much  individualist  as  interactionist.  Mead,  that  is,
envisioned an abstract situation of interaction and theorized how such an abstract form
of  interaction  could  in  principle  prove  to  be  the  origin  of  both  the  individual
consciousness on the one hand and the set of general rules constitutive of a social entity
(the generalized other) on the other hand. But in accomplishing this intellectual tour de
force, Mead used examples and arguments that were about abstract human individuals
who were for  some unspecified reason without individual  consciousness,  rather than
specifically about babies, who were already at the center of the “origins of mind” debate
as it was posed at the turn of the twentieth century by psychologists like Baldwin. Mead’s
main argument in the Mind section of Mind, Self,  and Society was not essentially about
education  or  socialization,  but  about  the  abstract  logical  requirements  of  a  possible
account that  derived mind from interaction with an outside world in the context  of
certain limited ego endowments. The Meadean account did succeed in straddling the gap
between Kantian apriorism and Humean associationism, but it did so by a logical rather
than a developmental argument. There was little ontogeny to it.
34 In the Self  section of  Mind,  Self  and Society,  to be sure,  there was a distinct  sense of
ontogeny. Children’s games played an important auxiliary role in Mead’s account (Mead
1934: 150-64), and the acquisition of the generalized other was construed in explicitly
developmental  terms.  But  by  comparison  with  his  contemporaries’  developmental
writings,  Mead’s  developmentalism was  vague.  One  has  only  to  compare  Mead  with
Piaget, whose first works appeared at the same time as Mead was giving the lectures that
became  Mind,  Self,  and  Society,  to  see  the  rapidity  with  which  strong  and  narrow
developmental assumptions – and the banishing of the phylogenetic side of the Baldwin
program to philosophy or biology – had enabled developmental psychology to bypass the
pragmatists. This transformation was accomplished particularly by Edouard Claparède – a
friend and occasional collaborator of Baldwin’s – and above all by Claparède’s brilliant
student Jean Piaget. By comparison with Piaget’s Play, Dreams, and Imitation in Childhood,
which although published in 1945 was built on Piaget’s research in the 1930s, Mead’s
account of the role of play in symbols is only very loosely ontogenetic, whereas Piaget,
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pulling the cat’s cradle very hard indeed, makes the detailed ontogeny of intelligence into
the  central  process  of  psychology.  Mead  was  thus  in  some  sense  moving  backward,
towards  the  abstract  individualist  position,  rather  than  prioritizing  ontogeny  over
phylogeny as had Claparède and Piaget.15
35 Rather than embrace this new ontogenetic focus on individual development over time,
Mead thus remained in the world of abstract philosophical imaginings. His concepts of
“interaction” and of “calling out the same response in self as in the other” are concepts
like “state of nature” and “primal horde”: abstractions employed to make a clear point
about the logic of particular situations. Through them, Mead was indeed able to produce
self and society out of the same singular process of interaction – surely an intellectual
triumph, given the complete dominance of the Enlightenment social ontology with its
independent  and  prior  adult  individuals.  But  he  accomplished  this  triumph  only  by
largely ignoring real change over real time, at both the individual and social levels. This
backward step may have been the price of his processualizing move.
36 As for the issue of social differences, the Self section of Mind, Self, and Society occasionally
does  recognize  the  non-concentric  nature  of  the  “generalized  others”  in  which  one
participates (e.g., Mead 1934: 157). But Mead did not really consider the resulting problem
posed for the self – the need for internal unification of what could be wildly differing self
attitudes and consequently the problem those differing selves posed for social solidarity
itself.  And  yet  this  very  issue  constituted  the  main  empirical  work  and  theoretical
concern of Mead’s colleague and friend W. I. Thomas. Thomas taught about attitudes from
1913-14 onward, and the dialogue between personal attitudes on the one side and social
values on the other is the central concern not only of the “Methodological Note” of The
Polish Peasant but indeed of the text as a whole (Abbott & Egloff 2008). Also central to that
work  is  an  attempt  to  account  for  the  emergence  and fixation  of  social  differences
(between groups)  in  the  process  of  interaction,  another  of  the  theoretical  processes
discussed in the Methodological Note, and a topic ignored even in the social differences
literatures discussed earlier. (Differences were there taken for granted.) By contrast with
Thomas’s  robust  inquiry,  Mead’s  social  theory  usually  presumed  a  nested  series  of
concentric generalized others leading up to that most general of generalized others, the
League of Nations (1934: 209, 287). Although there are occasionally examples drawing on
actual  political  situations  (e.g.,  1934:  187-8),  these  are  interspersed  with  static
phylogenetic comparisons referring to the contrast of human experience with that of
sentinels in animal herds (1934: 190-1). Mead’s argument is abstract, absolutely scalable
across all levels of temporal comparison.
37 Thus we see that the price of Mead’s merger of the individual and the social was the
forfeiting of a truly temporal account of either the individual or the social level, and more
specifically of  the emergence and fixation of  differences at  the social  level.  It  is  this
problem more than any other that derails any attempt to generalize Mead’s pragmatic
“socializing” of  cognition by,  for  example,  extending it  to the question of  emotional
development.  Such  accounts  would  need  to  parallel  Mead’s  account  of  cognition,
demonstrating  the  origin  of  both  the  personal  emotional  self  and  (say)  the  group
emotions of the “madness-of-crowds” type in a single interactive emotional process. But
the  only  compelling  accounts  of  individual  emotional  life  are  very  strongly
developmental. To “socialize” emotional life without recognizing developmental issues
would therefore be a self-evident mistake.
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38 Moreover,  while  the  Mead  theory  of  mind  and  self  seems  excellent  in  its  abstract
perfection, the mind and self of any given individual arise in a context filled with other
individuals and selves which are far more fully developed – parents, teachers, and elders
– and filled as well  with developed institutions like family,  school,  and workplace. In
practice, a realistic general framework cannot ignore the location of development within
an already existing and highly particular social process. And it must even confront fixed
social differences of a non-functional type – nationalism, for example. In summary, while
Mead succeeded admirably at showing individual/society dualism, he did so that the price
of removing all  particularity.  But since particularity is universal,  his arguments were
necessarily limited. To surpass him, one must pull the cat’s cradle not just on the two
points of individual and society, but also on a third point - the embedding of each of these
in particular lineages of development. 
 
B. Dewey on Development and Difference
39 It  was  of  course  John  Dewey  who  began  this  analysis  of  individual  development  in
particular contexts. His reform of education had very specific origins: it aimed to respond
to  the  disappearance  of  particular  kinds  of  training  that  used  to  occur  in  most
households:  sewing,  craftwork,  woodworking,  and so on.  Individual  development and
social change are thus both central to Dewey’s thinking, as are social differences. This is
perhaps not unrelated to the fact that it was Dewey, too, who pushed the pragmatist
program most strongly in the normative direction.
40 In  the  first  place,  Dewey  in  his  educational  writings  was  much  more  explicitly
developmental than pragmatism theretofore. To be sure, he could when necessary write
in the earlier,  non-developmental  style.  Human Nature and Conduct (1988) is  meant to
theorize the psychological structure of a fully developed adult, in the tradition of the
great Enlightenment philosophical psychologies like the first book of Leviathan, Locke’s
Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature, and Kant’s three
critiques. But even here Dewey cannot avoid putting the character into motion, noting
the importance of development in chapters 4 and 5, and – not by coincidence – raising in
the  same chapters  the  issue  of  social  differences.  But  Dewey is  usually  a  full-blown
developentalist,  and it  is  in  his  early  thinking on education –  contained in his  1899
lectures  on  the  philosophy  of  education  –  that  we  see  his  detailed  developmental
approach for early education.16
41 The analysis rests on two great pillars. The first is the idea that education consists of the
“adjustment”  of  the  individual  to  the  surrounding  society.  Education  is  thus  always
fundamentally social in its origin and the origin of the self necessarily social. But the self
is  not  merely  social.  For  at  the  same time,  the  individual  always  engages  the  social
through antecedent endowments (e.g., Dewey 1966: 48). Dewey had thus already begun in
1899 to adumbrate the position – which Piaget would soon elaborate – of the dual cycle of
assimilation (adjustment of novel input to preexisting endowments) and accommodation
(adjustment of self to novel external inputs).17
42 The second pillar for Dewey is the premise that education is never a goal in itself: It is not
a specific content, a specific set of skills (or even Deweyan habits) acquired once and
forever. In this sense, Dewey’s account is completely processual. As he would later argue,
all interim ends must eventually become means to other further ends. He thus refuses to
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acknowledge any particular content to education, just as he would later argue in The 
Public and Its Problems that there could be no once-for-all form of “good government.”
43 Dewey was quite specific about development, giving explicit phases in education in the
1899 lectures (Dewey 1966b: 149). Setting aside infancy, he sees age 3 to about 7 as a first
phase, 7 to puberty as a second, puberty to 18 or 20 as a third, and 20-plus as a fourth. In
classic Deweyan fashion,  these stages are distinguished by their differing relations of
means and ends. The first stage is one of “direct experience”: no distinctions of means
and ends, no distinction of process and product. There is simple immediacy of experience.
The  second  stage  is  the  transition  from  immediacy  to  the  beginnings  of  deferred
experience, via separation of means and ends, a distinction evident in the shift from play
to games. The third period is a period of coming into consciousness of a larger society of
which one is a part: a world of inclusive wholes (Dewey 1966b: 158) which define and
locate themselves as rules, procedures and generalizations.18 The child gains a sense of
the large-scale and important, versus the detailed and local, and now conceives of him- or
herself as a part of something that is outside and other. A fourth phase is about entering
into  work:  choosing  a  place  where  one’s  skills,  abilities,  and  shortcomings  will  find
optimal expression, “the line of work which is best suited to his capacity and in which he
is capable of rendering the greatest service to society” (Dewey 1966b: 159).
44 Although Dewey was thus strongly developmental, he was less concerned, in the 1899
Lectures at least,  with difference. He did not really confront the enormous variety of
individual children, perhaps because he was mainly concerned with young children and
with the grades in which education was already almost universal in coverage and content.
And,  looking  beyond  education,  neither  did  he  problematize  the  fit  between  young
people’s very varying abilities and desires on the one hand and the work demanded in the
labor force on the other, even though he lived through a period in which much of the
craft  work  that  he  thought  was  highly  educational  was  not  only  stripped  from the
household (as  he had noted,  in his  arguments on behalf  of  craft  education)  but  also
stripped from the labor force entirely through mechanization and automation. He did
speculate that “the mechanic ought to have something within him which would make
him more intelligent, more ethical, more cultured in his calling, as well as the doctor or
minister or lawyer” (1966b: 172). No doubt he was thinking of the various virtuosi of craft
culture: the plumber who has learned from long experience and reflection the complex
behaviors of hot water heating systems, for example. But while he may have theorized
the  idea  of  craft  genius,  and  indeed  although he  focused  intensively  on  the  loss  of
household  instruction  for  little  children,  Dewey  did  not  theorize  this  shifting  work
process explicitly, even though it created many of the problems that he wanted education
to ameliorate. Thus it is fair to say that Dewey’s analysis of social differences did not
really deeply affect his analysis of development.19
 
C. Dewey as Processualist
45 Dewey is, however, a committed processualist. An important sign of this is his strong
emphasis on the present, combined with his strong commitment to the openness and
possibility of the future. For Dewey, education is really an attitude about the relation
between self  and the non-self  world.  It  is  an agreement to continue learning,  not to
become a dead self through habit. It is a commitment to process. But despite his high
hopes for the future, Dewey does not really address the question of how process itself
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maintains ideals and conserves the good, rather than just wandering among new (and
possibly  meretricious)  possibilities.  He  certainly  felt  that  he  (John Dewey)  could  not
foresee the future and that the future would need to makes its decisions for itself, in light
of things we could not possibly know now. That was the creed of processualism. But other
than mandating adjustment in the future, he is unwilling to specify strategies and criteria
for that adjustment. This would prove to be an Achilles heel for his political theories, as it
is  for  any  processual  politics:  there  is  no  obvious  way  to  guarantee  avoidance  of
“adjustment” to totalitarianism and its like. 
46 This processual creed shone especially strong in Dewey’s later work on the higher levels
of education, in the book Democracy and Education (1916). Here Dewey becomes explicit
about lifelong education and has drawn the inevitable conclusion that once we regard
education  as  enduring  throughout  the  whole  of  life,  in  a  society  that  is  continually
changing,  we  have  arrived  at  the  theoretical  problem of  the  mutual  constitution  of
society and individual  as  particular  things,  over  time.  Moreover that  problem is  not
expressed simply in the Meadean form of abstract individualism, but as a question of
practical historical experience.
47 Dewey had thus come to the threshold of  a  fully  particularized processual  ontology,
embracing  both  particular  individuals  and  particular  social  structures  in  a  mutually
constituting system. Dewey himself  did not,  however,  directly theorize this ontology.
Rather, that task was undertaken by Thomas and Znaniecki’s The Polish Peasant In Europe
and America, which began appearing two years after Democracy and Education and whose
research was contemporaneous with it. The mutual constitution argument pervaded the
Methodological Note and the first two books of The Polish Peasant. The study of historically
differing institutions pervaded the entire text. And the biographical and developmental
approach was implicit in the 200 pages autobiography of the hapless Wladek Wiszniewski,
which was the third volume of the original edition. Indeed, The Polish Peasant – whose
motivating author was after all a longtime friend and colleague of Mead and Dewey –
should  be  regarded  as  the  most  comprehensive  (if  not  very  clear)  statement  of  a
pragmatist  approach  to  empirical  social  science.  It  is  also  the  most  sophisticated
pragmatist text in terms of integrating personal development and institutional change
(that is, the necessarily particular histories of individuals and of social entities) into a
fully  processual  social  ontology.  This  argument  appears  in  the  center  of  the
Methodological Note and seems to have been forced out of Thomas by Znaniecki (see
Abbott & Egloff 2008), whose social emergentism was rigid enough to counter Thomas’s
diffuseness and commitment to an almost random processualism.20
48 Thus The Polish Peasant came as close as any pragmatist text to a work showing the mutual
constitution of society and the individual as particular things, not as abstractions of the
type Mead had envisioned. Yet Dewey himself retreated from the need to theorize these
particular  histories.  By  embedding  his  concept  of  education  within  the  concept  of
democracy,  Dewey made a crucial  move.  On the one hand,  he moved the pragmatist
position towards explicit normative commitment. In one sense, this naturally reflected
Dewey’s concern for education, which is inherently a normative activity, since it involves
choices of what to teach and how to teach it. But in another sense, this commitment
derived from the pragmatist desire to judge activity in terms of its consequences and the
pragmatist recognition that such judgment is always partly normative, and indeed that
therefore any successful social ontology must not only be, as I have just argued, historical
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in both individual and social-entity terms, but also willing to recognize the social process
as in part inevitably normative. 
 
D. Dewey as Normative Democrat
49 But by making a normative turn towards democracy,  Dewey inevitably had to accept
some  of  the  concepts  of  social  ontology  implicit  in  the  longstanding  philosophical
foundations of democracy. These lay in contractarian liberalism, at least as far as most of
his readers were concerned. And the social ontology of contractarian liberalism was then
and has since remained largely ahistorical. As a result Dewey seems to give up – on the
normative side – what he has achieved (in part) on the empirical one. Just as Mead had
stepped back from developmentalism and differences to craft his mutual constitution
argument for individual and society, so also Dewey seems to pull back from particularities
in his attempt to add the normative dimension to his mutual constitution argument.
50 A  brief  aside  is  necessary  about  the  inadequacies  of  the  normative  ontology  of
contractarian liberalism. Under the normative ontology of contractarianism, the political
world is constituted of equal individuals in a state of nature who have come together to
make a society.  This coming together is,  of  course,  a normative ideal  expressed as a
hypothetical history, not an empirical model. But it nonetheless serves to generate the
concepts of liberty and of equality before the law which in turn underwrite the legal and
political systems that are the empirical foundation of most democratic societies. But the
normative ontology of contractarianism in practice thus enacts a legal and political world
that is quite at variance with what we know perfectly well is the ontology of the empirical
world. Contractarian theory divides the world into an ideal public and political world,
and a less-than-ideal private and empirical world.21 The normatively ideal side of this
ontology comprises free and equal citizens without particular (private) ties affecting their
participation in universal political life. The empirical and private ontology – willy nilly –
comprises  differentiated individuals  linked through dozens  of  complexly  overlapping
groups, wide inequalities associated with numerous different types of stratification, and
overdetermination  such  that  politics  conducted  in  terms  of  one  of  these  bases  of
stratification has  complex knock-on effects  through the  others.  Thus,  the  normative
ontology of contractarianism not only lacks any serious model of complex particularities
(which are banished to the private world), it also lacks a serious model of history, of
inheritance,  of  lineage.  While  all  of  these  things  also  profoundly  shape  democratic
societies in practice, they are banished by the normative ontology of contractarianism to
the almost unanalyzed “private” realm of society. It is a great ideal, but one achieved by
sweeping many inconveniences under the rug.
51 Dewey understood the inadequacy of this simplistic approach. His notion of democracy is
both more complex and more processual. He did not think democracy was one thing or
one set of institutions, as the heritage of classical liberalism typically thinks. Yet even his
own two major definitions of democracy themselves leave serious questions.
52 In Democracy and Education, the main definition of democracy – the first of two in the this
book – comes in Chapter Seven on “The Democratic Concept in Education.” Dewey gives
two  basic  standards  for  democracy  (1966:  83):  “How  numerous  and  varied  are  the
interests which are consciously shared? How full and free is the interplay with other
forms of association?” These standards (diversity and free interplay) are fine criteria for a
democracy, but of course there are crucial assumptions. One is the assumption that the
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“various interests” do not include anti-democracy, a matter which would become central,
immedately after Dewey wrote, through the rise of fascism.
53 More subtle and insidious is the second assumption. Dewey has no doubt of the existence
of varied interests. Because of that, he does not recognize that in his ideal society, varied
interests might actually become scarce. His definition – hardly surprising for a definition
propounded in 1916 – takes the existence of great diversity for granted and asks how
highly diverse groups can get along. But those diverse interests, whose preservation and
interaction are the supposed glory of liberal and democratic society, could perhaps only
be created in societies that were themselves relatively closed and even close-minded.
Thus, it is a beautiful thing to talk about diverse religions or languages or schools of art
getting along with each other. It is quite another to imagine how any individual religion
or language and school of art can – within a society committed more or less to eclecticism
– come to the coherence and strength that allows it to represent a serious alternative to
current religions or languages or schools of art.
54 This problem of the origin of difference no doubt seemed irrelevant to Dewey. After all,
difference  was  arriving  on  the  steamships  every  day,  and  the  entire  contractarian
tradition, buried in a narrowly economic concept of self-interest and frightened by the
religious differences that had destroyed Europe 1500-1650, ignored the possibility that
the creation of serious cultural or social difference might become a problem. Only the
mass society literature – Ortega y Gasset (1932) and others – asked this question (as well
they might in an era of strident populism and fascism), and it is striking that they were
themselves soon branded as fascists (by the left) for daring to pose it. But in the end, the
sources of difference remain a question for Dewey. Granted that in this first definition
democracy  involves  different  kinds  of  people  making  common  cause,  the  question
remains: where does real difference come from?
55 Dewey’s later definition of democracy, in The Public and its Problems, was again twofold,
but this time two fold in terms of individual and society.
From the standpoint of the individual, [democracy] consists in having a responsible
share in forming and directing the activities of the groups to which one belongs and
in participating according to need in the values which the groups sustain. From the
standpoint of the groups, it demands liberation of the potentialities of members of
a group in harmony with the interests and goods which are common […]. A good
citizen finds his conduct as a member of a political group enriching and enriched by
his participation in family life, industry, scientific and artistic associations. There is
a  free  give-and-take;  fullness  of  integrated  personality  is  therefore  possible  of
achievement  since  the  pulls  and responses  of  different  groups  reinforce  one
another and their values accord. (Dewey 1927: 147-8)
56 The difficulty with this definition becomes visible as soon as we begin to try to insert it
into real history. Consider the individual first.  Across the life course, the individual’s
responsible share in forming and directing the activities of the groups to which he or she
belongs must  necessarily vary with the many personal  qualities  that  vary in the life
course: intellectual development, education, group-relevant skills and expertise, degree
of  commitment  to  the  group,  and  so  on.  Likewise,  the  individual’s  needs  will
systematically vary:  by alternative sources,  by ill  health and other damages,  by prior
experiences that have created advantage or disadvantage. Moreover, once we put the
individual  in motion,  we must confront the issues of  moral  hazard,  uncertainty,  and
discounting, which disturb the simple flow of responsible power and justifiable need. On
the  social  side,  the  notion  that  a  society’s  diverse  artistic,  political,  industrial,  and
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scientific  groups  inevitably  accord  because  of  cross-cutting  pulls  is  probably  wishful
thinking, and Dewey was either unaware of or ignored the extensive use of the American
political system for set-asides and private benefits for this or that social group, be it
ethnicity, gender, race, social class, age grade, or illness risk group. And those are only
the synchronic difficulties. Dewey writes as if there is no gain and loss in political life, as
if  one  could  count  on  a  rising  tide  that  would  raise  all  boats.  One  is  reminded  of
Rousseau’s remark that true democracy is a government only for angels.
57 This is surely not to say that Dewey has not identified a great ideal. He has indeed done
that, as he so often did. But in point of fact, the American political system handles all
these many problems of history and particularity via a legislative and legal system based
mainly on procedural rather than substantive safeguards, and one that has not always
had a strong record for social  equity.  We would be well-advised to rethink the very
premises of our social contract, embedding it in real time and recognizing the continuous
process of group conflict that it represents,  as well as recognizing that we should be
aiming to produce whole lives that are just (in Dewey’s word, democratic), rather than
simply thinking about equity moment by moment. There is no automatic inference that
equity moment to moment must inevitably produce equity in the long run.
58 To  be  sure,  throughout  The  Public  and  Its  Problems Dewey  emphasizes  the  need  for
experiment  and  change  in  political  institutions.  But  he  never  tells  us  how  those
experiments are going to be accomplished and who is to judge (and how) whether they
have succeeded or failed. There is today, for example, a state-led movement to call a
constitutional  convention  in  the  US  to  force  the  Federal  Government  to  balance  its
budget,  but  those  who  propose  it  have  begun  to  realize  that  other  institutions  –
institutions that protect their power like the Electoral College, winner-take-all voting,
and the Senate – could in fact all disappear if that convention took a surprising populist
direction. Indeed, it is not clear that anyone dares truly experiment with the form of the
U. S.  government.  This follows from another of Dewey’s insights in The Public  and Its
Problems, which is that the chief aim of law is predictability of consequences (1927: 53-4).
Experimenting with government is bound to produce enormous unpredictability.
59 We see then that although Dewey has done well in recognizing development, and has
maintained  the  Meadean  coplanar  processualizing  of  individual  and  society,  his
encounter with the contingencies of group history is not as solid, and as a result his views
of current group differences are adrift.  Moreover, he has not completed a contingent
theory of individual development, but has left development mainly universal, largely in
order  to  reconcile  his  theory  with  requirements  arising  from the  simple  normative
ontology  of  contractarianism.  All  that  said,  of  the  great  pragmatists,  he  alone  really
makes the transition to processualism. If he failed to draw some necessary conclusions,
that is because the initial leap is one of such extraordinary daring.
 
III. Requisites of a Processual Ontology
60 The analysis  here makes clear that much of pragmatist  social  theory,  although quite
processual, proceeded in the modality of “abstract individualism.” It accepted the notion
that society comprised adult individuals whose qualities could be understood as given in a
moment.
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61 Mead’s attack on the vernacular social theory of the time placed even such an abstract
individual on the same ontological level as society. He challenged the vernacular view at
its strongest point: its belief in the origins of mentation through personal experience on
an associationist basis. By arguing that mentation was first a social act and only later an
individual one, Mead turned the vernacular on its head. Individual and society were now
coplanar.
62 But Mead accomplished this by working chiefly in an abstract rather than a concretely
processual  manner.  This  almost  certainly  reflected  polemical  necessity.  Anglo-Saxon
social  and  legal  thinking  has  worked  in  the  vernacular  of  the  English  and  French
contractarians  since  the  early  eighteenth  century.  To  engage  it  one  must  talk  its
language,  which includes  not  only  the  contractarian logic  but  also  the  mechanically
associative psychology that could produce – independently of any social experience –
adult consciousnesses that could come together to make a contract. Society was thus in
that  vernacular  a  somewhat  static  collection  of  mature  individuals  rather  than  a
continuous process in which young people were first entering families and then entering
the larger  society  (changing both of  them in the  process),  then aging and changing
further, then growing old and dying. By showing that even on its own terms this view was
incoherent and probably erroneous, Mead erased the vernacular relation of individual
and society. But he did not then move on to place those elements in a new and fully
processual  interpretation.  Dewey by contrast did so,  largely because of  his particular
subject focus of education. Although Human Nature and Conduct proceeds on traditionally
abstract lines, all of Dewey’s writings on education are strongly developmental.
63 Two things seem important about pragmatist developmentalism. First, it does not touch
the topic of emotion. The pragmatist philosophical program concerned the relation of
thought and action. Emotions make hardly any appearance in Peirce. They command a
characteristically brilliant chapter of James, who conjectured that emotion was merely
the cognition of a state of bodily feeling, thereby turning another of the vernacular truths
on its head (James 1950, 2:  449).  But one feels that the analysis is clever rather than
persuasive, and one doubts whether James himself – a man given to lengthy and profound
depressions – can have actually believed his own theory. This wilful ignorance of emotion
continues through to Dewey. The final judgment of the pragmatists on emotions may well
be Dewey’s remark in Human Nature and Conduct (1988: 177) that “alas, emotion without
thought is unstable. It rises like the tide and subsides like the tide irrespective of what it
has  accomplished.”  There  is  no  clearer  statement  of  the  pragmatist  credo  that
accomplishment is the test of all things.
64 It  was  rather  Freud  who  made  a  decisively  emotional  account  of  human  ontogeny.
Whatever we may think of the contents of his theory, it – and the broader life course
concept of development of which it is the most elaborated exposition – have triumphed
absolutely  as  vernacular  theories  of  modern emotion and indeed of  the  modern life
course.  Yet  the  pragmatist  response  to  Freud,  and even to  life  course  psychological
theories more broadly, is almost nonexistent.
65 The other main quality of pragmatist developmentalism is something shared with Freud
and  indeed  with  most  other  developmentalists.  This  was  an  abstract  approach  to
development  itself.  Freud  claimed  that  his  theory  of  emotional  development  was
universal.  Dewey, as we have seen,  could often ignore individual differences between
children.  More  broadly,  the  vulnerability  of  individual  development  to  the  kinds  of
differences  in  culture,  family,  and  social  institutions  that  were  characteristic  of  the
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United States at the turn of the twentieth century is largely unnoticed. That is, while
Dewey integrated the concept of development very clearly into the social ontology of the
pragmatists,  he  did  not  do  so  while  simultaneously  recognizing  the  vast  differences
within the population both in terms of what they brought to the society and in terms of
the positions in the society available  for  them to occupy.  Different  kinds of  families
produced different kinds of ontogenies, and the perpetual changes of a modern consumer
society – in jobs, in goods, in morals – meant that development could take numerous
turns. Indeed, those differences and turns have become one of the great political issues
between the American left and right.
66 More  generally,  the  pragmatists  also  failed  to  theorize  the  various  forms  of  social
difference themselves:  ethnicity,  religion,  gender,  age,  class,  ability,  and so  on.  Even
Thomas and Znaniecki saw only distantly the complex interactions and overlaps of these
things, with the result that the “developmental” story for social entities – the logical
equivalent of individual ontogeny – all too often evinced a gradualist “loss-of-tradition”
approach  of  the  kind  Dewey  skewered  in  the  opening  sections  of  The  Public  and  Its
Problems. Yet Dewey’s own concept of multiple publics does not in fact sustain a serious
analysis of social differences.
67 In short,  the pragmatists made the move to development on the one hand, and, to a
limited extent, to a real history on the other. But they did not really view difference in
full round, either as presenting problems to be solved or as being, in itself, something
that could possibly weaken or disappear. But fascism and most forms of communism soon
eradicated  much  social  difference,  with  extraordinary  consequences.  The  pragmatist
social ontology was dangerously irrelevant in a world filled with unitary states of left and
right, which called themselves democratic but were not so in practice. Indeed, one of the
issues raised by totalitarianism was whether the achievement of a society’s modernity
might itself not require, in historical terms, the virtual destruction of the free experience
of whole cohorts of that society. This was a process Dewey could and did judge, certainly,
but it was not something of which his theory could make sense.
68 Here  again  we  confront  the  prices  of  Dewey’s  admirable  theoretical  commitment  to
normative thinking in general and to democracy in particular. Dewey recognized that
complexifying the purely empirical conception of the social world was not enough. To be
sure it  was essential  to recognize development.  And,  to a certain (but not sufficient)
extent,  he  saw that  it  was  important  to  imagine  that  development  as  happening  in
parallel with dramatic changes in social institutions. But Dewey also saw that our social
ontologies themselves involve normative judgment – right and wrong – because the social
process is itself a process of values (as the pragmatists would have said, the social process
is about the quality of the consequences of our actions). Yet when he chose a normative
ontology he tended to  slide  back into  the familiar  world of  contractarianism,  which
obviously describes a world that never was and can never be: a world without history,
without particularity and difference, without development. This makes moral judgment
relatively easy, and provides familiar terms for one’s audience.
69 But it  means that  his  normative theory is  adrift.  In the first  place it  doesn’t  tell  us
anything about the vast proportion of the world that is not democratic or liberal and
shows no sign of becoming so. In the second place, it doesn’t tell us anything about the
everyday  politics  of  the  nation,  which  mainly  concerns  conflicts  between complexly
overlapping  social  groups,  and in  particular  those  groups’  attempts  to  remove  their
concerns from the cut-and-thrust world of everyday politics (the private world of the
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contractarians) and to get them onto the list of things that are protected and sustained by
universal  public  rules  and  transcendental  legitimacies  (the  public  world  of  the
contractarians).  Nor  does  Dewey really  provide  us  with  anything  like  an  ontological
framework for thinking about the succession of these groups in time.
70 We come then to the end of this review with a number of new requisites for a processual
ontology. The first is that it recognize individual development and life-course trajectory
as essential to any general theory of society. The second is that this trajectory not be
conceived in simplistic directional terms, as in the functionalists’ theory of socialization.
It must be seen as a complex and contingent system, with regularly patterned internal
contingencies. The theory of age structure, the lexis diagram, and such tools must be
essential parts of this ontological approach. Third, a similarly ontogenetic approach must
be taken to social entities, with the additional proviso that their overlapping and shifting
topology requires tools not yet invented to extend the kind of demographic approach we
have used for biological individuals.
71 Fourth, and most important, we must refuse to allow ourselves to choose any one of these
aspects of analysis as primary. For that is the danger of pure ontogenetics, as it is of pure
organization theory, and so on. The reason pure developmentalism fails is that by pulling
the cat’s cradle purely in the direction of trajectory, it uses up all the degrees of freedom
in  the  system  for  that  one  project.  But  in  fact,  organization  theorists,  or  pure
demographers, or others could pull the cat’s cradle in other directions and exhaust those
same degrees of freedom in different ways. (Ecological theories – for which I am myself
well  known  –  are  an  equally  obvious  example.)  But  the  degrees  of  freedom can  be
exhausted only once, and that is by a social process in which both of individual and social
developments  are  mutually  conditioning  each  other,  and  in  which  the  theoretical
expectations we might generate from a theory based on only one side are preempted by
changes on the other. This is the great insight we must take from Mead. It is correct that
the individual and the social derive from the same process of interaction. But they do so
not under abstract but under very particular circumstances. And this very particularity is
what  makes  their  mutual  interdependence  so  difficulty  to  theorize.  But  also  so
worthwhile. Our task is to understand the nature of the cat’s cradle itself, not to find out
what happens when we pull it in one theoretical direction.22
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NOTES
1. Of course there is much more to say about these topics in the early Pragmatists. I mention
them here briefly for the sake of completeness in an analysis mainly aimed at their successors.
Note  that  the  dominant  social  thought  of  the  time in  the  Anglophone world  was  Spencer’s.
Spencer’s position on development and difference might seem to resemble James’s in its abstract
individualism, particularly in Spencerism’s vulgar version as Social  Darwinism. But Spencer’s
Descriptive Sociology volumes contain comprehensive functionalist and institutionalist accounts of
hundreds of societies. Spencer was in fact obsessed with social differences, but dealt with them in
functionalist terms, more than historical ones. 
2. For a discussion of the literary sources of the new approaches to behavior, see Abbott & Egloff
2008. 
3. On mass schooling, see Tyack 1974. On the mental hospitals, see Abbott 1982, and Grob 1983. 
4. Baldwin’s  major  works  are  Elements  of  Psychology (1893),  Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations  in
Mental  Development (1897),  Mental  Development (1903),  and  Genetic  Theory  of  Reality (1915).
Secondary works on Baldwin include Sewny 1945 and Broughton & Freeman-Moir 1982. 
5. A dated but comprehensive and still useful history of historical writing is Barnes 1937. For a
contemporary account, see Breisach 2007. 
6. It is the “middle Freud” who has this methodological resemblance with history, of course. The
early Freud of “psychic energy” and the later “pseudo-historical” Freud are both far from this
psychodynamic conception rooted in hypothetical analyses of a past whose chief warrant was its
plausibility given the symptomatology of the present. 
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7. Examples are Malinowski (1927), Kardiner (1945), and Roheim (1952). The relevant Freud texts
are The Ego and The Id (1962) and Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1960). 
8. On the loss of the “social” side of psychology, see Greenwood 2004. The “universal psychology”
account of personality was simultaneously systematized and attacked in Allport’s famous text of
1937. On the one hand, the book is an attack on absolute psychological universalism. Allport said
psychologists  were  “enthusiastically  at  work  on  a  somewhat  shadowy  portrait  entitled  ‘the
generalized  human  mind’”  (Allport  1937:  vii).  On  the  other.  Allport  aimed  to  pull  all  the
“nomothetic constructs” of his colleagues into a single (and presumably universal) thing called
“the personality,” which involved social difference only insofar as it affected that personality.
The book was  thus  making a  synthetic,  but  still  universal  claim.  Allport  did  argue that  this
universal quality of having a personality was done differently by every individual. He was thus
accepting the fact that it is universal to be particular, but only for the case of the personality. But
this personality is a universal, ahistorical thing – in the book’s closing words (1937: 566) “[The
individual] stuggles on even under oppression, always hoping and planning for a more perfect
democracy where the dignity and growth of each personality will be prized above all else.” 
9. The  literature  on  these  developments  is  enormous.  A  classic  text  is  Hofstadter’s  Social
Darwinism in American Life (1944). 
10. The  greatest  statement  in  this  literature  was  of  course  Dewey’s  Democracy  and  Education
(1966a). The rather skeptical secondary literature starts with Tyack 1974. 
11. The basic Park sources are Park 1950, and Park & Burgess 1921. 
12. Again  the  secondary  literature  is  large  and  again  it  begins  with  Hofstadter  (1955).  See
Rodgers 1998 for a more recent general analysis.
13. Biographical  sources  on  Mead  include  Joas  1985,  and  Huebner  2014.  See  also  Lewis  &
Smith 1980, and Deegan 1988. On Dewey, see Dykhuizen 1973, and Ryan 1995. 
14. A standard history of evolutionary thought is Bowler 2003. Note that Mead’s texts predated
what is usually called the “modern evolutionary synthesis” of the 1930s, in which Mendelian
genetics was firmly articulated with Darwinian theories of variation and selection. 
15. For biographies of Claparède and Piaget see, respectively, Pieron 1941 and Vidal 1994. Piaget
was born in 1896 and thus was about thirty years younger than Mead. But he was extremely
precocious,  and  his  first  monographs  (Le  langage  et  la  pensée  chez  l’enfant,  Le  jugement  et  le
raisonnement chez l’enfant, and La représentation du monde chez l’enfant, date from 1923, 1924, and
1926 respectively. The magisterial La naissance de l’intelligence chez l’enfant dates from 1936). 
16. It was apparently an occasional practice to have the courses of major lecturers recorded by
student  stenographers  (hence  the  dozens  of  Mead transcripts  discovered  by  Daniel  Huebner
(2014:  233-43).  In  1963,  Richard  D.  Archambault  discovered  by  happenstance  a  transcript  of
Dewey’s  1899  lectures  in  the  Grinnell  College  Library  and  prepared  the  published  edition
discussed here. 
17. The names of these processes – well-known to any reader of Piaget – came from Baldwin’s
Mental Development in the Child and the Race. On Piaget’s antecedents, see Bennour & Vonèche 2009.
18. Dewey, too, was thus a theorist with a concentric view of social units. It is not clear whether
this was for him a strong personal position or a mere analytic convenience. 
19. The crucial difficulty here was that the industrial workers tended to acquire skills strongly
related to particular technologies and untransferable from one technology to another – mule
spinners were a classic example, but there are many others. Physicians and other professionals,
by contrast, were able to learn skills that would last a lifetime or that could be updated steadily
and systematically across the life course. 
20. A long and partisan literature has attempted to distinguish the contributions of  the two
authors to this magisterial work. A review of the primary material and of Thomas’s prior work
makes clear that the main architecture and core ideas of the text – its problematics, its genre, its
style, and, above all, the pragmatists themes of processualism and mutual-constitution – were
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longstanding themes in  Thomas’s  life  and work,  dating from well  before his  encounter  with
Znaniecki. See Abbott & Egloff (2008: 231-3). 
21. The division in clearest in Rousseau’s Social Contract, e.g., in the discussion of equality book II,
Section xi, which opposes political equality to economic and social inequality. More generally,
the division is clear in the distinction of the general will, which emerges from equal citizens and
cannot err, and the private wills of individuals. From this distinction comes Rousseau’s explicit
contrast of the general will and the “will of all,’ which is the mere sum of private wills (in II: iii).
22. I have myself begun to attempt this theory in the various essays of Processual Sociology (Abbott
2016), carrying forward arguments I have made in several earlier works. Successful analysis must
start from the premise – common to Mead and Dewey – that causality happens in the present and
that, as noted in the present paper, all influence from the distant past must come through the
continuous encoding of past effects into the immediate present via a process of encoding. The
first task is then to explain how such a continuously changing world – a world of events – can
exhibit so many signs of stability. The second is to trace the consequences of the fact that there is
no one single time-space present, but rather an extended space of presents through which causes
and  actions  travel  to  distant  events  they  may  ultimately  affect.  Such  ontological  issues  are
canvassed  in  the  early  chapters  of  the  book,  while  the  later  chapters  begin  to  address  the
normative issues that preoccupied Dewey. Nonethless, the book is only a series of beginnings on
the main enterprise. I am currently working on a more formal exposition. 
ABSTRACTS
In this paper I shall examine how the pragmatists regarded the context of a single self in time
(the problem of personal development over the life course) and the context of a single self in
social  space  (the  problem  not  only  of  surrounding  individuals  but  also  of  surrounding  and
fundamentally different groups). After a quick glance at the ontologies of the earlier pragmatists,
I discuss the problems of individual development and social difference as they emerged society-
wide during and after the first pragmatist generation. Having specified these problems, I can set
the  second  pragmatist  generation  in  the  context  they  provide.  The  paper  concludes  with  a
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